By Chandan Shah
Military government of Myanmar has given India a fresh reassurance: it will not allow groups hostile to Indian interests to operate from its territory. It’s a promise that matters deeply, given the long history of tension along one of South Asia’s most volatile borders. And it’s one that comes with a critical caveat, Myanmar’s ability to deliver on it is increasingly uncertain.
“The President of Myanmar in particular reiterated the assurance that Myanmar’s territory would not be permitted to be used against India’s security interests,” Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said.
“The aspect of internal security is obviously the effort by the Myanmar State to bring all the ethnic armed organisations and groups onto a single platform to advance the peace process… this is something in which we obviously have an interest, because stability and peace in Myanmar is a major interest for India, not just for the security of the Northeast and the safety and security of people living along the 1,643-km-long border that we have with them, but also for our interests, such as connectivity to Southeast Asia,” he said.
“Security and stability in Myanmar is also important for the coherence of ASEAN as a whole, because Myanmar is an important and large country within the ASEAN framework,” he added.
“Apart from that, there is the very important question of the activities of Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar close to our borders, and this is something that the Prime Minister raised with the President. The President once again reiterated his assurance that Myanmar was sensitive to these concerns, and would do everything necessary to ensure that there was action on these, and these don’t become a cause of threat against the security of India,” he said.
Myanmar & India: A Border Out of Control
The 1,643-kilometer India-Myanmar border is dense, difficult terrain, thick with forest, porous in places, and historically difficult to police. For decades, it’s been a safe haven for insurgent groups. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and various armed groups from Manipur have all found refuge here. Sagaing region and Chin State in Myanmar have long served as training grounds and rear bases, where militants regroup and rearm before slipping back across the border to conduct operations in India’s Northeast.
India has raised this concern repeatedly across multiple Myanmar governments, civilian and military alike. The problem has only intensified since Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021. As the junta lost control of territory to the Peoples Defence Force and ethnic armed organisations, border areas descended into a lawless vacuum. For Indian security planners, that’s a nightmare scenario: ungoverned space on the frontier is an open invitation for Northeast insurgents to operate with impunity.
Why India Can’t Afford to Walk Away?
New Delhi has refused to join international condemnation of Myanmar’s military, choosing instead to maintain cooperative ties. This isn’t moral ambivalence but rather it’s cold calculation.
- The security cooperation works, at least in theory. India’s counter-insurgency operations rely heavily on coordination with Myanmar forces. In 2015, Indian Army special forces conducted strikes against NSCN (K) camps inside Myanmar. Those operations don’t happen without a certain level of tacit agreement.
- India’s ambitious regional connectivity agenda depends on stability with Myanmar. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are cornerstone projects for India’s Act East Policy. They can’t move forward if bilateral relations are strained. Myanmar is, quite literally, India’s gateway to Southeast Asia.
- India knows it can’t just talk to the junta anymore. Myanmar’s military is fragmented and spread thin across an ongoing civil war. Ethnic armed organisations control significant chunks of territory, especially near the Indian border. Some have past links to Northeast insurgents. So India engages with these groups quietly, understanding that border management now requires a more complex diplomatic footprint. Speaking only to the military command in Naypyidaw won’t cut it.
The Promise and the Reality of Myanmar
Myanmar’s recent promise falls squarely within a history of security cooperation between the two countries. On paper, it’s reassuring. But there’s a critical problem: Myanmar’s capacity to deliver is being tested like never before.
The junta’s control is fragmented. With military resources stretched across a civil war, it’s genuinely unclear whether they can effectively monitor the border, intercept insurgent movements, or shut down supply lines. What gets promised in diplomatic meetings doesn’t always materialise on the ground. Indian security officials understand this gap intimately. They welcome Myanmar’s commitment, sure but they’re not banking on it alone.
Instead, India is taking matters into its own hands. New fences are going up along the border. The Assam Rifles, India’s paramilitary border force is being deployed in larger numbers. New military bases are being established. In other words, India is preparing for the possibility that Myanmar simply can’t keep its word, even if it wants to.
Myanmar & India Relationship Under Real Strain
The India-Myanmar relationship is under pressure from multiple angles right now. The civil war in Myanmar has sent waves of refugees across the border into Indian states like Mizoram and Manipur taxing local resources and creating social friction. There’s suspicion among some communities that India is carrying an unfair load.
Manipur itself has been wracked by communal violence since 2023, with hundreds killed and tens of thousands displaced. While the root causes are primarily local tensions between different ethnic communities, there’s credible evidence that weapons are being smuggled into Manipur from Myanmar. That complicates India’s relationship with the junta further.
Yet despite all this, India and Myanmar keep talking. Myanmar knows it needs India as an international interlocutor, one of the few major countries still willing to engage diplomatically. India knows it needs a cooperative Myanmar for its own security and regional strategy. The relationship is strained, but it’s not broken. And both sides seem to understand that it can’t be allowed to break.
What Happens Next?
Myanmar’s promise is meaningful in diplomatic terms. But its real value will be measured in actions, not words. India will be watching for concrete steps: whether Myanmar actually cracks down on identified insurgent camps, whether intelligence-sharing improves, whether supply lines across the border are genuinely disrupted.
Realistically, India’s best-case scenario is a Myanmar that stabilises, reasserts control over its territory, and partners genuinely on border security. But that’s a way off, probably not until the civil war winds down.
In the meantime, expect India to do what it’s already doing: maintain the relationship and the diplomatic channel, while quietly strengthening its own defences. Accept Myanmar’s promises at face value in public forums, while operationally preparing for the possibility that they can’t be kept. Engage not just with the military junta, but with the ethnic armed organisations that actually control parts of the border.
Myanmar’s assurance is a start. It’s a signal that the junta understands New Delhi’s concerns and that border management remains a priority. But in the fog of Myanmar’s internal conflict, promises need constant reinforcement to stick. India will keep its eye on Myanmar’s actions. Until things change on the ground, India’s hedging strategy is talking cooperation while building its own capacity is the only rational move.